Written by Miki Tasseni – First published in Business Times, Dar es Salaam
Former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa has been making rounds in various institutions to address what appears to be an urgent problem: the European Union’s stance on stalled partnership agreements with African countries. While most other ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries have initialled such accords, Africa—except for outliers like Seychelles and Mauritius—largely remains hesitant. This hesitation, as Mkapa emphasizes, should be understood not as an ACP issue, but an African problem.
In his recent article, Mkapa argues that African countries prefer maintaining the status quo, which he views as geared toward development. In contrast, he sees the EU’s push for vast liberalisation as a threat—one that could dismantle Africa’s fragile agricultural systems and erode its budding industries. Mkapa warns that entering into an economic partnership agreement (EPA)—essentially a free trade area underpinned by a common market—would spell ruin for Africa.
But this narrative, as advanced by the former president, fails to ask a foundational question: why has Africa failed to break the chains of poverty over five decades since independence? And more importantly, how would the continuation of the status quo address this crisis?
There seems to be little recognition in Mkapa’s argument that Africa is in a deep, structural crisis—economically, socially, and environmentally. International institutions may cheer about Africa’s emerging middle class or celebrate GDP growth (6.3% in Tanzania, for instance), but such figures are hardly reflective of transformative development. At the heart of Mkapa’s concern is the idea that liberalisation with the EU could undermine Africa’s ability to develop and industrialise. Yet one must ask: why has integration with the EU not stalled the development of Eastern European countries after the 1990s expansion from 12 to 25 members?
The answer is unsettling: many African bureaucrats, whom Mkapa represents, oppose deeper integration not because of economic logic but due to fears of losing control. They are wary of welcoming Europeans back into Africa—not because of past colonial scars alone, but because of what liberalisation would mean in practice: land reform, open markets, transparent regulations, and ultimately, a dilution of elite privileges.
In Mkapa’s view, the entry of Europeans into farming and other productive sectors would ruin local agriculture. But the evidence suggests otherwise: infusions of capital, technology, and expertise—combined with fair, long-term leases of land—could elevate agricultural productivity and land value. Ironically, the very people Mkapa defends—bureaucrats and elites—are the ones preventing such growth. They resist structural transformation because it threatens the familiar: cheap land, unregulated business environments, and minimal competition.
The fear of land being “grabbed” by foreigners is rooted in a deeply conservative mindset, where land is seen as sacred and communal. While concerns about exploitative practices are valid, the outright rejection of any transfer or long-lease model ignores potential benefits like capital flow, job creation, and credit circulation. Not everyone would squander land sale proceeds; many would reinvest in housing, businesses, and education, creating a ripple effect in local economies.
Bureaucratic stagnation, however, remains the preferred path. It preserves the privilege of planning post-retirement lives in rural and urban homes, bought cheaply under the current land regime. Opening up to European business would challenge this entrenchment, possibly making land more expensive and competitive. And while bureaucrats may applaud Barack Obama’s election in the U.S., they would never tolerate the idea of a white Tanzanian MP.
Mkapa cites research from the South Centre warning that an EPA would jeopardise East African production of maize, barley, animal feed, and other commodities. But such research lacks neutrality. The fear is not about competition but about control—a reluctance to allow commercial farming, even if it benefits the broader economy, unless done by “acceptable” investors under tightly guarded privilege.
He also highlights contradictions within the EU, noting pushback from certain Parliament committees regarding the EPA signing deadlines. While the Trade Committee suggests extending the deadline to 2016, Mkapa interprets this as a victory. But the deeper issue is not EU flexibility—it is Africa’s inability or unwillingness to reform.
Europe’s caution, Mkapa rightly notes, is partly due to fear of African backlash—seizure of assets, political instability, or violent nationalisation. The EU treads carefully, as it must, because Africa has shown that irrational, atavistic reactions are not out of the question. Dictators like Idi Amin and Robert Mugabe have set a precedent.
Ultimately, liberalisation will not come through dialogue—it will come through collapse, when African economies can no longer sustain themselves and the dictatorship option no longer exists. Until then, Africa’s articulate bureaucrats will continue spinning growth myths and demonising European integration—not to protect the people, but to protect privilege.